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(PKI)Abstract The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) passed by the US
Congress establishes a number of privacy/security regulations for e-healthcare systems. These reg-
ulations support patients’ medical privacy and secure exchange of PHI (protected health informa-
tion) among medical practitioners. Three existing HIPAA-based schemes have been studied but
appear to be ineffective as patients’ PHI is stored in smartcards. Moreover, carrying a smartcard
during a treatment session and accessing PHI from different locations results in restrictions. In
addition, authentication of the smartcard presenter would not be possible if the PIN is compro-
mised. In this context, we propose an MCS (medical center server) should be located at each
hospital and accessed via the Internet for secure handling of patients’ PHI. All entities of the
proposed e-health system register online with the MCS, and each entity negotiates a contributory
registration key, where public-key certiﬁcates issued and maintained by CAs are used for authenti-
cation. Prior to a treatment session, a doctor negotiates a secret session key with MCS and uploads/
retrieves patients’ PHI securely. The proposed scheme has ﬁve phases, which have been imple-
mented in a secure manner for supporting HIPAA privacy/security regulations. Finally, the security
aspects, computation and communication costs of the scheme are analyzed and compared with
existing methods that display satisfactory performance.
ª 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud University.1. Introduction
E-healthcare is an online approach that includes patient treat-
ment, generation of diagnostic reports (PHI), secure storageand access to PHI data such that only authenticated entities
can retrieve and update the data through the Internet. The
medical practitioners generally retrieve old PHI data during
a new treatment session, and the currently generated PHI is re-
stored and updated with new medical information (Aljumah
et al., 2013; El-Sappagh and El-Masri, 2013). The protection
of patients’ privacy is also considered in an e-health system.
However, the deployment of an e-health system fulﬁlling all
these requirements is a challenging job. Several bills by differ-
ent health agencies and authorities have been proposed, and
HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) (Collmann et al., 2004; HIPAA, 1996a,b; Yanga et al.,
2006) was voted into federal law by the United States Congress
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tions a set of conceptual guidelines to be strictly maintained
and followed by all healthcare organizations for improving
healthcare services, including qualities and overall efﬁciency
of an e-health system. In addition, HIPAA highlights patients’
privacy (Federal Register, 2002; Huanga et al., 2009; Jin et al.,
2011) and provides direction to other countries considering
HIPAA guidelines along with their respective domestic laws.
Although this direction can help facilitate the initiation of
other countries deploying e-health systems, no speciﬁc proce-
dures in HIPAA are provided for maintaining patients’ privacy
and security regulations.
The detailed speciﬁcations of HIPAA are available in Coll-
mann et al. (2004), HIPAA (1996a,b) and Yanga et al. (2006).
These speciﬁcations have been summarized and used in many
e-healthcare schemes (Hu et al., 2010; Huang and Liu, 2011;
Lee and Lee, 2008; Lee et al., 2011; Li et al., 2008). For the
sake of clarity, the summarized outcome requirements of HI-
PAA in regard to privacy and security regulations (Hu et al.,
2010; Huang and Liu, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2008), which have
also been used in our e-health scheme, are brieﬂy stated below.
1.1. Privacy regulations
Privacy regulations (Hu et al., 2010; Huang and Liu, 2011; Lee
and Lee, 2008) deﬁne a patient’s right to understand and con-
trol the use/disclosure of his PHI, comprising the patient’s
name, address, contact number and medical records.
1.2. Security regulations
The security regulations of HIPAA (Hu et al., 2010; Huang
and Liu, 2011; Lee and Lee, 2008), which mainly consist of ﬁve
terms, are as follows:
(1) Patients’ understanding: The patients’ right to under-
stand how their PHI will be used and kept must be
maintained.
(2) Conﬁdentiality: Various software safeguards such as
encryption and decryption authentication are described
to protect health data during storage and transmission.
(3) Patients’ control: Patients must have control in accessing
and using their PHI data.
(4) Data integrity: Patients’ electronic health information
should be protected from medical omissions, tampering
and unauthorized destruction.
(5) Consent exception: In life-saving and other exceptional
situations, access to PHI without patient’s authorization
is allowed.
A HIPAA based e-health system was initially proposed by
Lee and Lee (2008), which was followed by Hu et al. (2010)
and Huang and Liu (2011). We studied these proposals thor-
oughly and will now present their outcomes. In 2008, Lee
and Lee (2008) proposed a health data card-based e-healthcare
scheme, where a smart card is used by a patient for secure stor-
ing and/or retrieving of PHI during a treatment session. A
symmetric encryption-decryption with a session key generated
with the healthcare provider is used for conﬁdentiality of the
PHI data. Thus, it becomes a session-based e-health scheme,
which means that each patient come in direct contact withmedical staff during a treatment session and produces his
smart card for accessing/updating PHI data. This creates
certain limitations such as PHI is available only when both pa-
tient and the smart card are physically present at the health-
care provider, and hence, it is not possible to access the
smartcard from a distant location through the Internet. In
addition, the multiple accessing of a patient’s PHI may not
be feasible simultaneously, such as when different expert opin-
ions are needed and for pathological tests and analyses. The
smartcard-based approach also adds additional overhead if
the laboratories for different medical test-sample analyses are
located in a wide geographical distribution. Finally, a security
ﬂaw may exist in a smart card with a PIN-based system, where
instead of the owner, the presenter of the smartcard is authen-
ticated if the PIN is compromised.
Some contract-based e-health systems are also available in
literatures (Agrawal et al., 2005; Agrawal and Johnson, 2006;
Bhatti et al., 2007; Hu and Han, 2009; Lambrinoudakis and
Gritzalis, 2000; May, 1998; Yu et al., 2006), where patient’s
PHI is entirely left to a medical service provider (MSP) for
storage. In these systems, a patient signs for a ﬁxed contract-
period with the MSP, and any medical staff can access the
same during this contract period. However, it may be noted
that every access to the patient’s PHI is controlled and pro-
tected by the MSP. An existing contract-oriented e-health sys-
tem based on HIPAA privacy/security regulations is described
now.
In 2010, Hu et al. proposed an e-health system for HIPAA
privacy and security regulations where a hybrid security
scheme based on public key infrastructure (PKI) and a Medi-
care smartcard is used. In this scheme, a patient initially col-
lects his smartcard from a smartcard trust center (STC) and
uses the same card for signing a contract with an MCS (med-
ical center server) for certain duration. The smartcard, which
contains the patient’s information and valid public–private
key pair collected from the patient’s PKI digital certiﬁcate,
is used for authenticated negotiation of a contract key with
the MCS. The patient’s PHI is stored in the MCS in plain-
text form, and medical staff, without prior consent of the pa-
tient, can access the PHI data securely. On request, the MCS
sends both contract key and PHI data to medical staff, where
the contract key and the PHI are encrypted by the public-key
of the medical staff and contract key of the patient, respec-
tively. After completion of the contract period, the PHI data
are ﬁnally deleted from MCS. This scheme has certain limita-
tions as described now. First of all, it violates the HIPAA
privacy/security regulations as no patient-consent during
storage/retrieval of PHI to/from MCS is required. As the pa-
tient’s PHI is only kept in the MCS and deleted after the con-
tract period, the patient has no way to acquire a copy of his/
her PHI for subsequent treatment processes. Moreover, this
scheme does not account for legal requirements involved with
patient’s consent exception cases. Therefore, if an emergency
situation exists, it cannot be handled without legal
complications.
Similar to Lee and Lee’s scheme (2008), an e-health
scheme based on a smart card to satisfy HIPAA privacy
and security regulations is proposed by Huang and Liu
(2011). In this scheme, elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is
used for different security operations such as password pro-
tection/update, signature generation for signing contract
agreement and veriﬁcation and encryption-decryption of
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(2008) is that for comparable security it requires, ECC being
an additive group method, a smaller key length than the key-
size required in multiplicative group based-PKI (Koblitz,
1987; Miller, 1985). As a result, the computation-communica-
tion costs for registration, signature generation-veriﬁcation,
encryption-decryption processes and storage requirements
are signiﬁcantly reduced. In addition, the scheme has a pro-
vision for allowing patients to freely choose and update their
passwords. However, this scheme, because of the use of a
smartcard, also possesses all the aforementioned limitations
in the analysis of the Lee and Lee’s scheme (2008). The
Huang and Liu scheme also has the limitations associated
with supporting session-based e-health services as discussed
in the earlier analysis that revealed that a contract-oriented
e-health scheme is better than a session-based system (Agra-
wal et al., 2005; Agrawal and Johnson, 2006; Bhatti et al.,
2007; Hu and Han, 2009; Lambrinoudakis and Gritzalis,
2000; May, 1998; Yu et al., 2006).
This paper addresses all these issues and presents a uniﬁed
e-health system for HIPAA privacy and security regulations
that not only incorporates all the merits of the different
schemes analyzed but also uses existing PKI for efﬁcient imple-
mentation and use. Our e-healthcare scheme is a contract-ori-
ented scheme that allows a patient to sign a contract and
register with an MCS, where a CA-based digital certiﬁcate is
used for initial authentication. Similarly, each medical staff
registers with the MCS and negotiates (including patients) a
contributory registration key with the MCS. This key is used
for subsequent authentication and negotiation of a session
key prior to each new treatment session. In this scheme, in-
stead of a smartcard, the MCS connected through the Internet
is used for secure storage/retrieval of PHI, where symmetric
encryption based on a session key is used. At the end of the
contract period, a copy of PHI is securely sent to a patient;
however, the PHI is never deleted from the MCS. In addition,
our scheme allows for a patient to extend the current contract
period or re-register with the MCS, especially when the previ-
ous registration key is compromised. The main contributions
of this work are as follows. (1) It supports a contract-oriented
approach and uses an MCS for PHI data storage, which thus
avoids all drawbacks that exist in session- and smartcard-
based systems. (2) All entities initially follow CA-based
authentication for registration with the MCS; however, a
negotiated session key is used for subsequent authentication
and securing different operations required in the proposed
e-health system. The system thus avoids additional overhead
involved in maintaining and processing of the CA-based certif-
icate. (3) As PHI is loaded into the MCS system, any actor
with prior registration to the MCS can access patients’ PHI
data over the Internet from any geographical locations. (4) Fi-
nally, a patient receives updated PHI data at the end of his/her
contract period.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides the proposed CA-based e-health
system, where each of the six phases is described with ﬂow
diagrams and algorithmic steps. As a performance study,
the fulﬁllment of HIPAA security and privacy regulations,
implementation feasibility and applications and comparisons
in terms of some characteristic features with three existing
schemes are presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 con-
cludes the paper.2. Proposed CA-based e-health system
In this section, an e-health system for satisfying HIPAA pri-
vacy/security regulations is presented. It uses existing PKI, in
which a CA acts as a trusted agency to issue public-key certif-
icates for veriﬁcation and validation of a user’s public key
(Elgamal, 1985; Levi et al., 2004; NIST, 2001; Stallings,
2009; Weise, 2001). The PKI is a hierarchical tree structure
of CAs with a root CA that creates, distributes, veriﬁes and
revokes users’ public-key certiﬁcates based on the X.509
standard (Elgamal, 1985; Levi et al., 2004; NIST, 2001;
Stallings, 2009; Weise, 2001). In fact, a public-key certiﬁcate
combines a user’s identity with a public key, and thus, users,
upon exchange of their certiﬁcates among themselves, become
authenticated to each other and receive authenticated public
keys as well.
In our system, all patients, doctors and other medical staff
obtain their public-key certiﬁcates from a CA. A patient, who
wishes to use an e-healthcare service, must register with a
medical center server (MCS). Similarly, the doctors and other
medical staff are also registered with the MCS, which contains
all healthcare information, including the patient’s PHI. The
patient’s PHI generated after the completion of a treatment
session is uploaded to the MCS, and a copy of the same is se-
curely sent to the patient. The patient’s PHI stored in the MCS
is accessible online and if necessary, any foreign MCS (FMCS)
can access PHI with prior registration with the MCS. How-
ever, for authentication, each FMCS must receive a certiﬁcate
from a CA for validation of its public key. The details of our
proposed scheme are given below, and the following common
notations are used:
h(_) a secure one-way hash function
(e.g., SHA1, MD5, etc.)
E encryption
D decryption
P patient
MCS medical center server
IDP identity of a patient
IDDOC identity of a doctor
RMCS a random challenge generated by the
MCS
UMCS another random challenge generated
by the MCS
KREGP registration key of a patient
KREGD registration key of a doctor
KS a random secret session key
generated by a doctor
CAP public key certiﬁcate of a patient
CADOC public key certiﬁcate of a doctor
CAMCS public key certiﬁcate of MCS
(PRP, PUP) patient’s private/public key pair
(PRDOC, PUDOC) doctor’s private/public key pair
(PRMCS, PUMCS) MCS’s private/public key pairThe proposed CA-based scheme consists of six phases,
namely registration, PHI generation, PHI upload, PHI retrie-
val, handling emergency situations and foreign access, each
of which is addressed below.
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As stated earlier, the proposed e-health system requires regis-
tration with an MCS for all patients and medical staff, includ-
ing doctors, and in this section, the proposed registration
procedure for a patient is discussed. The validity of the regis-
tration depends on the signed agreement w, sent by the patient.
Any medical staff that are directly/indirectly involved must fol-
low the same registration procedure for MCS registration. The
registration procedure comprises the four messages given in
Fig. 1, which are described below.
Step 1: PatientﬁMCS: IDP, Signed agreement w, CAP
Patient initially sends a registration request with his public
key certiﬁcate, identity and a signed agreement w to the
MCS. After receiving the request, the MCS validates the
patient’s certiﬁcate and retrieves the valid public key of
the patient.
Step 2: MCSﬁ Patient: EPUP ðRMCSÞ, CAMCS
In response to the patient’s request, the MCS generates a
random number RMCS with k-bit security level, designated
a challenge, to the patient and encrypts it using the patient’s
public key. The MCS then sends the encrypted message
along with its public key certiﬁcate to the patient in message
2. Note that the public key certiﬁcates of the patient and
MCS are exchanged for their authentication purposes as
well as to obtain their valid public keys.
Step 3: PatientﬁMCS: EPUMCS ðRMCSkgk1Þ
The patient validates the MCS’s certiﬁcate and retrieves the
valid public key of the MCS. Then, the patient decrypts the
message sent by the MCS using his private key and cor-
rectly obtains the challenge RMCS. The patient now selects
a random number k1 (0 6 k1 6 p  1) and calculates a pub-
lic value gk1 mod p, where p is a large prime number, and g
is a generator of order p  1 in the group < Zp, · >, and
both are public. Then, the patient concatenates RMCS with
gk1 , encrypts the concatenated message using the public key
of the MCS and ﬁnally sends the encrypted message to the
MCS.
Step 4: MCSﬁ Patient: w, EPUP ðRMCSkgk2Þ; EPRMCS ðhðwÞÞ
After receiving the message, the MCS decrypts the message
using its private key and extracts the challenge RMCS andFigure 1 Registrathe public value gk1 : Then, the MCS compares the received
challenge with its own challenge, sent to the patient and if
the comparison passes, it selects a random number k2
(0 6 k2 6 p  1) and calculates the corresponding pubic
value gk2 mod p in the same group. The MCS also generates
the patient’s registration key as KREGP ¼ ðgk1Þk2 ¼ gk1 k2
mod p and stores it in its database corresponding to the
patient’s identity. Then, the MCS concatenates its public
value with the same challenge RMCS, encrypts the concate-
nated message using the patient’s public key and ﬁnally
sends the encrypted message to the patient along with the
agreement w and its signed copy EPRMCS ðhðwÞÞ for integrity
purposes.
After receiving the MCS’s message, the patient decrypts
the encrypted message using his private key and obtains
the MCS’s public value and RMCS. He then compares the
newly received RMCS with the previously received RMCS in
message 2. If the comparison passes, the patient then calcu-
lates his registration key KREGP ¼ ðgk2Þk1 ¼ gk1 k2 mod p,
which is same as the registration key obtained by MCS.
To verify the integrity of the signed agreement w, the
patient decrypts the signed message using the MCS’s public
key and obtains h(w) = H (say). He then generates the hash
digest of the publicly received w as h(w) =H’ (say) and
checks H’ = H? If he conﬁrms the relationship, he saves
the signed agreement and his registration key for future use.
2.2. PHI generation, upload and retrieval phases
PHI generation, along with its upload and retrieval proce-
dures, is described in this section. In our proposed scheme, a
patient physically visits a doctor whenever treatment is re-
quired, and then the doctor treats the patient and generates
the patient’s diagnosis data, designated PHI. The PHI consists
of two categories, namely text-data and image-data. Text-data
consists of sensitive textual data, including name, address and
medical text results, among other data, and image-data con-
sists of large-size medical images. In our scheme, the total
PHI data are uploaded to the MCS by the doctor, and the
patient only obtains a copy of his PHI text-data from the
MCS to learn treatment results. The patient obtains only histion protocol.
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comparison with PHI image-data. Thus, it is feasible to store
the text-data in a patient’s external drive.
To upload and retrieve a patient’s PHI data from the MCS,
i.e., prior to start of any treatment session, a doctor must nego-
tiate a temporary secret session key with the MCS. The session
key is temporary because it is deleted after completion of a treat-
ment session, and a new session key is negotiated for a new treat-
ment session. The generation of a secret session key, upload and
retrieval of a patient’s PHI in both normal and emergency con-
ditions are described in the following subsections.
2.2.1. Secret session key negotiation procedure
In this subsection, the mutual authentication and secret session
key negotiation procedure between a doctor and MCS is de-
scribed. The detail key negotiation procedure, comprising
three steps, is given in Fig. 2 and described below.
Step 1: DoctorﬁMCS: IDDOC, EKREGD ðKSkhðIDDOCÞÞ
The doctor randomly selects a secret number KS, concate-
nates it with the calculated hash digest of his identity,
encrypts the concatenated message using his registration
key KREGD ; and then sends the encrypted message along
with his identity IDDOC to MCS.
Step 2: MCSﬁ Doctor: EKS ðUMCSÞ
After receiving the message, the MCS obtains the doctor’s
registration key KREGD corresponding to the doctor’s iden-
tity from its database, uses it to decrypt the message sent by
doctor and obtains the secret number KS and the hashed
digest of doctor’s identity h(IDDOC) = H (say). For authen-
tication, the MCS calculates the hash digest of the openlyFigure 2 Secret session ke
Figure 3 PHI uploreceived doctor’s identity as h(IDDOC) = H’ (say) and
checks H’ = H? If the result is true, the doctor is authenti-
cated to the MCS, and the received random secret KS
becomes the secret session key for that session. For conﬁr-
mation, the MCS generates a random challenge UMCS,
encrypts it using the secret session key KS and sends to
the doctor.
Step 3: DoctorﬁMCS: EPRDOC ðhðUMCSÞÞ
In response to the MCS’s challenge, the doctor decrypts the
encrypted message using the secret session key KS, receives
the challenge UMCS, signs on it using his private key and
then sends it to the MCS.
If the challenge is answered, i.e., if the veriﬁcation of the
doctor’s signature is successful, then the session between the
doctor and MCS is established with session key KS. Other-
wise, the request is rejected.
Note that any doctor before attending a patient must negoti-
ate a secret session key with the MCS using the above protocol,
and at the end of the treatment procedure, the session key is
deleted. After negotiating a session key, the doctor may re-
trieve/upload the patient’s PHI both in normal and emergency
circumstances from/to MCS, the details of which are addressed
now.
2.2.2. PHI upload procedure
The patient’s PHI upload procedure involves the exchanges of
two messages – (1) from doctor to the MCS for uploading and
(2) from the MCS to the patient when he wants to obtain a
copy of his PHI text-data. The details of these exchanges are
given in Fig. 3and explained below.y negotiation protocol.
ading protocol.
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EPRDOC ðhðPHIÞÞ
The doctor concatenates the patient’s identity and PHI,
encrypts the concatenated message using the secret session
key KS and sends the encrypted message along with the
doctor’s identity to the MCS. To support the integrity of
the PHI, the doctor generates the hash digest of the
patient’s PHI, signs on it using his private key, and then
sends the signed message to MCS.
After receiving the message, the MCS obtains the session
keyKS from its database corresponding to the doctor’s iden-
tity, uses it to decrypt the encrypted message and obtains the
patient’s identity and PHI. Then, to verify the integrity of the
PHI, the MCS calculates the hash digest of the received PHI
as h(PHI) =H (say), decrypts the signed hash digest, sent by
the doctor, using the doctor’s public key, gets h(PHI) =H’
(say) and veriﬁesH’ = H? If the message passes veriﬁcation,
theMCS stores the patient’s PHI in its database correspond-
ing to the patient’s identity and sends a copy of the PHI text-
data by following step 2.
Step 2: MCSﬁ Patient: EKREGP ðIDDOCkPHI
text  dataÞ; EPRMCS ðhðPHI text  dataÞÞ
The MCS concatenates the doctor’s identity with the
patient’s PHI text-data, encrypts the concatenated message
using the patient’s registration key KREGP and then sends
the encrypted message to the patient. Signed PHI text-data
are also sent to the patient to support the integrity of the
PHI text-data.
After receiving the message, the patient decrypts the
encrypted message using his own registration key KREGP
and obtains the PHI text-data and the identity of doctor
who treated him. If the patient is sure about the identity
of the treating doctor, then he veriﬁes the integrity of the
PHI text-data as discussed in step 1 and if the veriﬁcation
is successful, he stores his PHI text-data.
2.2.3. PHI retrieval procedure
In this subsection, a patient’s PHI retrieval procedure is intro-
duced. As stated earlier, a doctor must negotiate a secret ses-
sion key with the MCS before starting a new treatment
session. This session key is then used to retrieve the patient’s
previous PHI (if any) from the MCS for ready reference and
better treatment of the patient. The PHI retrieval procedure,
consisting of two-message exchanges, is given in Fig. 4 and dis-
cussed below.
Step 1: DoctorﬁMCS: IDDOC, EKS ðIDDOCkIDPÞ
The doctor concatenates his identity with the patient’s iden-
tity, encrypts the concatenated message using the secret ses-Figure 4 PHI retrsion key KS, and then sends the encrypted message and his
identity as a PHI retrieval request to the MCS.
After receiving the request, the MCS obtains the doc-
tor’s identity, determines the session key KS from its
database, uses it to decrypt the encrypted message and
obtains the identity of patient and doctor. Then, the
MCS compares the extracted doctor’s identity with the
openly received identity and if the veriﬁcation is success-
ful, the MCS accesses the patient’s PHI from its database
based on the patient’s identity and proceeds to the fol-
lowing step.
Step 2: MCSﬁ Doctor: EKS ðIDPkPHIÞ
The MCS concatenates the patient’s identity with the
patient’s PHI, encrypts the concatenated message using
the secret session key KS, and then sends the encrypted mes-
sage to the doctor.
After receiving the message, the doctor decrypts the mes-
sage using KS and obtains the patient’s identity and PHI,
veriﬁes the patient’s identity in regard to whose PHI is
being requested and if everything is satisfactory, then the
doctor uses the PHI for the patient’s treatment.
Note that, for easy reference and quick diagnosis, the pa-
tient may provide his PHI text-data directly to the doctor by
providing his external drive. However, this method is totally
optional, but may be followed if there are any types of commu-
nication errors with the MCS.
2.2.4. PHI retrieval in patient’s emergencies
In patient’s emergency situations, e.g., when the patient is un-
able to provide consent for his treatment, a doctor initiates
treatment immediately, and no formalities, such as identiﬁca-
tion of the patient or retrieval of PHI, are required. However,
for better treatment and quicker diagnosis, the doctor may re-
trieve the patient’s previous PHI from the MCS. To handle
this situation, the doctor sends an emergency session request
to the MCS and negotiates a secret session key for the partic-
ular emergency session as discussed in Section 2.2.1. The de-
tails of the patient’s PHI retrieval procedure in an emergency
situation is given in Fig. 5 and described below.
Step 1: DoctorﬁMCS: IDDOC, EKS ðIDDOCkIDPÞ
The doctor concatenates his identity with the patient’s
identity, encrypts the concatenated message using the
secret session key KS, and then sends the encrypted mes-
sage along with his identity as emergency retrieval request
to the MCS.
After receiving the doctor’s emergency retrieval request,
the MCS obtains KS from its database based on the
doctor’s identity, decrypts the encrypted message using KSieval protocol.
Figure 5 PHI retrieval protocol in patient’s emergency situation.
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MCS then checks the integrity of the doctor’s identity by
comparing the decrypted identity with the openly received
identity. If both are the same, the MCS accesses the
patient’s PHI from its database based on the patient’s iden-
tity and follows the step discussed below.
Step 2: MCSﬁ Doctor: EKS ðPHIkwÞ
The MCS concatenates the patient’s PHI with the patient’s
signed agreement w, encrypts the concatenated message
using the secret session key KS, and then sends this
encrypted message to the doctor.
After receiving the message, the doctor decrypts the mes-
sage using the secret session key KS and obtains the
patient’s PHI and w, from which he obtains all the informa-
tion on the patient. At the end of the treatment session,
when the patient becomes physically ﬁt and the proper con-
sent from the patient is received, the doctor uploads the
patient’s updated PHI to the MCS as described in
Section 2.2.2.
2.2.5. Foreign access to patient’s PHI
For treatment in foreign areas, i.e., the areas of a patient’s
home country that are not covered by the MCS in which
the patient has registered as well as any foreign country, a
patient has to approach a doctor, who has already registered
with a local MCS and has negotiated a secret session key
with it. Then, two cases may apply. (1) All MCSes in a
country are interconnected through the Internet, or (2) All
national-level MCSes (a root MCS of a hierarchical tree
structure of MCSes of a country) in different countries are
interconnected through the Internet. If case 1 applies, then
a patient obtains treatment from any local MCS of his home
country using his same registration key negotiated with his
home MCS and the treatment of him/her in home country
is transparent as all the protocols proposed earlier are
equally applicable, and the uploading/retrieval of the PHI
to/from the home MCS can be performed through any local
MCS. On the other hand, treatment in a foreign country in
case 2 is only possible with the following:
1) A patient must register with a foreign MCS and receive a
secret registration key. The registration procedure as dis-
cussed in Subsection 2.1 can be used for this purpose.
2) After completion of diagnosis and receipt of medical
advice, the generated PHI needs to be uploaded to the
MCS and a complete copy of the same has to be pro-
vided to the patient. The protocols described in Subsec-
tions 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 are followed for these
procedures.3) Finally, the PHI generated in foreign countries is
uploaded to the patient’s home MCS with the help of
any doctor of the patient’s home country.
3. HIPAA regulation fulﬁllment and performance analysis of the
proposed scheme
In this section, we discuss the major contributions, validity and
acceptance of our scheme. An analysis was conducted to deter-
mine how the proposed scheme fulﬁlls the HIPAA privacy/
security regulations, and the results of that analysis are shared
in this section. Moreover, feasibility analysis is also discussed
to demonstrate the practical applicability of the proposed
scheme. Finally, the results of a performance evaluation of
the proposed scheme in comparison with other existing
schemes are also discussed to support our claims.
3.1. Fulﬁllment of HIPAA regulations
To illustrate and justify the fulﬁllment of HIPAA privacy and
security regulations (Collmann et al., 2004; HIPAA, 1996a,b;
Yanga et al., 2006), the following summarized HIPAA regula-
tions given in Hu et al. (2010), Huang and Liu (2011) and Lee
and Lee (2008) have been considered and implemented in this
paper.
3.1.1. Patient’s understanding
HIPAA requires a patient’s understanding regarding the clear
speciﬁcation of the whole treatment process, which must be
known and agreed upon by the patient. The contents of the
agreement mainly are about the secure storing and retrieval
of patient’s PHI, complete information of patient and related
information.
In our scheme, the patient’s understanding is included via
an electronically signed agreement w, which is sent to the
MCS with the registration request, and the same agreement
is signed and returned to the patient at the end of the registra-
tion phase. A copy of the ﬁnal signed agreement is also kept in
the MCS with the patient’s PHI for future reference.
3.1.2. Conﬁdentiality
According to HIPAA, various software safeguards, such as
encryption-decryption, may be used to provide conﬁdentiality
of patient’s PHI during storage and transmission over open
channels.
To provide conﬁdentiality of important data such as the
patient’s PHI, a public key certiﬁcate-based authentication
protocol has been proposed in the registration phase for
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and other medical staff. This key is then used as a master
secret key for providing consent/authorization of the owner
in different phases and negotiating a secret session key for
encryption/decryption of important messages. The public-
key certiﬁcate is used here for providing the initial security
association for subsequent operations. The negotiated secret
session key is used to send the encrypted patient’s PHI dur-
ing uploading and retrieval phases of the patient’s
treatment.
3.1.3. Patient’s control
According to the HIPAA privacy and security regulations, a
patient must have control of accessing his PHI.
Our scheme supports patient’s consent both in uploading and
retrieval of patient’s PHI. A both-side signed agreement exists
between the patient and the MCS during registration to obtain
consent for accessing the patient’s PHI data by any registered
medical practitioner in the whole valid registration period.
3.1.4. Data integrity
According to HIPAA, the surety of data integrity must be
kept, i.e., patient’s PHI must be protected from medical omis-
sions, tampering, unauthorized destruction and other such
undermining of data integrity during transmission.
In our scheme, a signature is generated on the patient’s
PHI, and the signed PHI is transmitted along with the en-
crypted PHI. The signed PHI is used to verify the data integ-
rity at the receiving end. Thus, data integrity is preserved in
our scheme.
3.1.5. Consent exception
HIPAA privacy/security regulations support consent excep-
tion situation i.e., for life-saving purposes and other excep-
tional situations, access to a patient’s PHI without the
patient’s consent is allowed.
In our scheme, a patient’s consent exception case is consid-
ered and discussed in Section 2.2.4 for handling a patient’s
emergency situation.
Thus, the proposed scheme ensures the patient’s under-
standing, conﬁdentiality, data integrity, patient’s control and
consent exception cases as required for fulﬁlling the privacy
and security regulations of HIPAA.
3.2. Feasibility analysis of proposed e-health system
In this section, a feasibility analysis, i.e., the implementation
aspects of the proposed scheme, is described. The key estab-
lishment and management with security, along with computa-
tional and storage performance of the proposed scheme are
mainly included and evaluated.
3.2.1. Efﬁcient key management
The proposed scheme involves typical public key certiﬁcates,
which are already available, for establishing the initial security
association among different entities. Then, based on a public-
key certiﬁcate, a two-way authenticated symmetric secret key,
known as a registration key, is generated using the Difﬁe–Hell-
man (DH) (Difﬁe and Hellman, 1976) technique, which
involves the exchange of only two short messages between theparticipants. The registration key is considered as a master
key, which is then used to generate a temporary secret session
key in each treatment session. All operations thus far involved
in our scheme are trivial except the storing and maintaining of
a large number of registration keys in the MCS. The key gener-
ation, distribution, storage and recovery are brieﬂy explained
below.
(1) For key generation, the MCS and patient compute a
contributory patient’s registration key KREGP ¼
ðgk1Þk2 ¼ gk1 k2 mod P using gk1 mod P and gk2 mod P
public values generated independently by the patient
and MCS, respectively. In addition, a random number
KS, assumed by a doctor, is negotiated with MCS using
his registration key KREGD : This KS is considered a secret
session key and used in a session. At the end of each ses-
sion, the existing KS is deleted, and a new KS for a new
session is negotiated. Because all these key generation
procedures are based on existing public key certiﬁcates,
they are secure and cost efﬁcient.
(2) As such, no key distribution is involved in our scheme
except for maintaining a database in MCS for key stor-
age and retrieval for different decryption/veriﬁcation
purposes. In addition, the patient’s PHI is encrypted
by the MCS using the patient’s registration key when
sending a copy of the same to the patient. In addition,
the MCS requires a public key certiﬁcate for each
patient/member of the medical staff, which results in
additional costs for storing, maintaining and verifying
their public keys. Thus, our e-healthcare scheme, instead
of distribution costs, mainly has key storage costs.
(3) For key recovery, the proposed scheme does not require
any key recovery operation because in emergency
situations, a doctor can directly retrieve the patient’s
PHI from the MCS with prior registration with the
MCS.
Hence, our scheme efﬁciently supports the generation, dis-
tribution and storage of keys and equally ensures the secrecy of
these keys with minimum cost because of the use of the
available public key infrastructure. Therefore, the proposed
scheme has the feasibility to be implemented in practical
applications.
3.2.2. Computational performance
The computational costs involved in different phases of the
proposed scheme are discussed in this section. The main com-
putational phases are the (1) registration phase, (2) session key
negotiation phase, (3) PHI uploading phase, (4) PHI retrieval
phase and (5) PHI retrieval in patient’s emergency. Their cost
requirements are given below.
3.2.2.1. Registration phase.
(i) The phase uses PKI for entity authentication, which
involves the veriﬁcation cost of a public key (Stallings,
2009), thereby requiring one hash operation (NIST,
2002) and one public-key decryption (Stallings, 2009)
for each side.
(ii) For mutual authentication and generation of a registra-
tion key, three random number generations (Biswas,
2011), four modular exponentiation operations (Difﬁe
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decryptions, one signature generation/veriﬁcation and
four message exchanges are required.
3.2.2.2. Session key negotiation phase. The cost includes cost of
the generation of two random numbers, two symmetric encryp-
tions/decryptions, one signature generation/veriﬁcation, and
the exchange of three messages.
3.2.2.3. PHI uploading phase. The cost includes the cost of two
symmetric encryptions/decryptions, two signature generations/
veriﬁcations and the exchange of two messages.
3.2.2.4. PHI retrieval phase. The cost includes the cost of two
symmetric encryptions/decryptions and the exchange of two
messages.
3.2.2.5. PHI retrieval in patient’s emergency. The cost includes
the cost of two symmetric encryptions/decryptions and the ex-
change of two messages.
Hence, the proposed scheme is cost-effective as most of the
phases have symmetric encryption/decryption operations,
where each requires much less processing time than a public-
key encryption/decryption. In addition, the communication
cost of our scheme is lower, as comparatively fewer messages
are exchanged. As for storage requirements, the patient stores
only a copy of his own PHI text-data and a signed agreement
w, and no storage requirement by any doctor is needed. More-
over, the patient’s PHI, registration key, signed agreement and
public key certiﬁcate are stored in the MCS, which has a suf-
ﬁcient database. Therefore, our scheme is efﬁcient in terms
of its storage requirements.3.3. Comparison with existing schemes
In this section, a comparison with three existing schemes is
provided as a performance evaluation of the proposed scheme.
Lee and Lee (2008) proposed a session-based solution that re-
quires the presence of a patient’s smart card, as the card stores
the patient’s PHI and master key for authentication. As a re-
sult, this scheme suffers from several limitations. (1) The pa-
tient’s PHI is available only when both patient and smart
card are physically present at the healthcare provider, and
there is also no possibility of accessing the patient’s PHI from
distant locations. (2) Simultaneous access to the patient’s PHI
is not feasible for such medical necessities because of gathering
of different medical expert opinions and pathological analysis.
(3) The smartcard-based approach also adds additional over-
head if the laboratories analyzing different medical
test-samples are located throughout a wide geographical distri-
bution. (4) A security ﬂaw may also exist with a PIN/pass-
word-enabled smart card, where instead of the owner, the
presenter of the smartcard is authenticated when the PIN is
compromised. (5) This scheme also requires a huge amount
of PHI (both text-data and image-data) storage in a smart
card, which may thus create burdens for patients in terms of
storage and maintenance. (6) Finally, as discussed earlier, in-
stead of a session-based scheme, the contract-based system
supports the entire treatment session, which appears to be
more suitable for an e-health system.Our scheme eradicates these limitations in the following
ways. (1) The patient’s PHI is kept by the MCS, so it is possible
to access patient’s PHI through the Internet from a distant loca-
tion. (2) Simultaneous access to the patient’s PHIover Internet is
also possible. (3) Different medical laboratories may access the
PHI and directly upload the patient’s test reports to the MCS
through the Internet. (4) No one is allowed to access patient’s
PHI until an authenticated registration with the MCS is com-
pleted. (5) The MCS securely stores and maintains patients’
PHI, and thus no burden is imposed on patients. (6) Lastly, a
contract-oriented e-health system is presented in this work.
In 2010, Hu et al. proposed a contract-based scheme to ad-
dress the HIPAA privacy and security regulations for e-health
systems. In this scheme, a hybrid security scheme based on
public key infrastructure (PKI) and a Medicare smartcard is
used. This scheme has several limitations – (1) It violates
HIPAA privacy/security regulations as no patient consent is
incorporated during storage (retrieval) of PHI to (from) the
MCS. (2) This scheme remains silent on the issue of patient’s
consent exception cases involved in handling patient’s emer-
gency situations. (3) A replay attack is possible during the
uploading and retrieval of PHI as an attacker can impersonate
a legitimate user by knowing information from previous com-
munications. (4) Lastly, the scheme, similar to Lee and Lee
(2008), suffers from the weaknesses inherent in using a
smart-card based system.
The proposed scheme overcomes all these limitations in the
following ways. (1) Prior to treatment, an agreement is made
between a patient and the MCS, which stores the patient’s con-
sent (only registered medical staff can access the PHI). (2) A
patient consent exception case is incorporated into our scheme
to handle patient’s emergency treatment. (3) The replay attack
is defended against in the proposed scheme by a registration-
and session-key negotiation-protocol containing nonce or ran-
dom numbers to prevent forging of participant credentials. (4)
Lastly, the proposed scheme uses a public-key certiﬁcate for
initial authentication of the entities and is thus free from any
smartcard-based weaknesses.
In 2011, Huang and Liu proposed a smart card-based
e-health scheme to satisfy HIPAA privacy and security regula-
tions, where ECC is used for key generation and management.
As stated earlier, this scheme is a modiﬁcation of Lee and Lee’s
(2008) scheme and because of the use of ECC, it requires a
smaller key size and thus has less computation and communi-
cation costs for registration, signature generation-veriﬁcation,
and encryption-decryption than Lee and Lee’s (2008) scheme.
However, this scheme has all the limitations of Lee and Lee’s
scheme (2008) except for allowing patients to freely choose
and update their passwords. Our scheme, similar to Lee and
Lee’s (2008) scheme, is free of all the limitations present in
the Huang and Liu (2011) scheme.
A feature-based comparison of the proposed scheme with
other three existing schemes is provided in Table 1 and shows
theoverall requirements andperformance in termsof some char-
acteristic features. As seen from Table 1, the proposed scheme
exploits most of the efﬁcient and usable tools in its implementa-
tion, and none of the existing schemes altogether supports the
last six useful features. However, the proposed scheme uses
PKI; thus, the additional overhead of maintaining and verifying
public-key certiﬁcates is keptminimal byproposing the one-time
use of PKI for initial veriﬁcation of different actors in the
scheme.
Table 1 Comparison of proposed scheme with three existing schemes.
Requirements/features Lee and Lee (2008) Hu et al. (2010) Huang and Liu (2011) Proposed scheme
Security architecture based on Session Contract Session Contract
Key type Symmetric Public–private ECC Public–private
Authentication based on Smart Card Smart Card Smart Card Public-key certiﬁcate
Medium used to access patient’s PHI Smart Card Internet Smart Card Internet
Patient’s PHI stored in Smart Card MCS Smart Card MCS
Simultaneous access of PHI No Yes No Yes
Access of PHI from distant locations No Yes No Yes
Protected from replay attack No No No Yes
Patient’s consent to upload and retrieve PHI Yes No Yes Yes
Handles patient’s emergencies Yes No Yes Yes
Communication and processing overhead High High Low Low
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proposed scheme has been built up with prior consultation
with some professional physicians, and all have expressed their
opinions in favor of our scheme. They also mentioned that it is
very exciting to go through the workﬂows speciﬁed and inter-
esting in terms of approaches considered for online e-health-
care implementation. However, they have commented that
the proposed scheme is much more effective with chronic ill-
ness rather than the acute onset of any illness.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, a CA-based e-healthcare system has been pro-
posed to satisfy HIPAA privacy and security regulations. It
uses the existing PKI and public key certiﬁcate to set up a con-
tract-based system with a MCS located at hospitals. In the
scheme, the MCS stores the patients’ PHI, which is securely re-
trieved/ updated by medical staff after the end of a contract
period. A patient also receives his updated PHI from the
MCS. The proposed e-health system consists of six phases,
and all of them are implemented securely. A security analysis
proves that the scheme is free from all relevant attacks. Lastly,
a comparison table is provided that highlights the usefulness of
the proposed scheme over three other existing schemes.
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